With AUTH_DEV_AUTOLOGIN=<username>, every /api request without a valid
session runs as that existing, active user and skips the forced password
change. Unset keeps the normal login; unknown or deactivated users still
get 401, real sessions take precedence, the CSRF application header stays
mandatory and the API logs a warning at startup. The switch is not
limited to localhost because the development instance is reached from
other machines and through a reverse proxy (THREATMODEL D2/R15). It must
never be set on an instance with real project data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Also document that Sec-Fetch-Site is only sent over HTTPS, so plain-HTTP
LAN access relies on SameSite=Lax alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security: per-username login throttling, constant-time unknown-user check,
Sec-Fetch-Site CSRF guard for writes, session rotation on login and
password change, absolute session lifetime, sessions ended on reset and
deactivation, last-admin protection, input length caps, ASCII usernames,
clickjacking headers. Covered by tests/authentication.test.ts.
Filter panel: toggle, fields and count share one row to save space.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
No self-signup: admins create every account in Config -> Benutzer with a
typed start password; a forced password change gates first use. Session-
cookie auth protects all /api/* routes; /api/users additionally requires
the admin role. See docs/authentication.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
