leistungsbilanz-ts/src/server/auth/auth.middleware.ts
Julian Appel 084002bea9 Add AUTH_DEV_AUTOLOGIN to switch off the login on development instances
With AUTH_DEV_AUTOLOGIN=<username>, every /api request without a valid
session runs as that existing, active user and skips the forced password
change. Unset keeps the normal login; unknown or deactivated users still
get 401, real sessions take precedence, the CSRF application header stays
mandatory and the API logs a warning at startup. The switch is not
limited to localhost because the development instance is reached from
other machines and through a reverse proxy (THREATMODEL D2/R15). It must
never be set on an instance with real project data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-30 09:03:29 +01:00

181 lines
5.8 KiB
TypeScript

import type { NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response } from "express";
import { SESSION_COOKIE, type AuthConfig } from "./auth-config.js";
import { readCookie } from "./cookie.js";
import type { SessionStore } from "./sessions.js";
import type { UserStore } from "../../domain/ports/user.store.js";
import type { UserRole } from "../../shared/constants/user-roles.js";
import {
WRITE_REQUEST_HEADER_NAME,
WRITE_REQUEST_HEADER_VALUE,
} from "../../shared/constants/request-security.js";
export interface AuthUser {
id: string;
username: string;
name: string;
role: UserRole;
mustChangePassword: boolean;
}
declare global {
namespace Express {
interface Request {
authUser?: AuthUser;
}
}
}
export function sessionIdFromRequest(req: {
headers: { cookie?: string | undefined };
}): string | undefined {
return readCookie(req.headers.cookie, SESSION_COOKIE);
}
export async function identityFromRequest(
req: { headers: { cookie?: string | undefined } },
sessions: SessionStore,
users: Pick<UserStore, "findById">,
slideExpiry = true
): Promise<AuthUser | undefined> {
const session = sessions.get(sessionIdFromRequest(req), slideExpiry);
if (!session) return undefined;
const user = await users.findById(session.userId);
if (!user || !user.active) return undefined;
return {
id: user.id,
username: user.username,
name: user.name,
role: user.role as UserRole,
mustChangePassword: user.mustChangePassword,
};
}
/**
* Session identity, or on a development instance with AUTH_DEV_AUTOLOGIN the
* configured active user. The auto-login user skips the forced password
* change because nobody signs in interactively.
*/
export async function resolveRequestIdentity(
req: { headers: { cookie?: string | undefined } },
authConfig: Pick<AuthConfig, "devAutoLogin">,
sessions: SessionStore,
users: Pick<UserStore, "findById" | "findByUsername">,
slideExpiry = true
): Promise<AuthUser | undefined> {
const identity = await identityFromRequest(req, sessions, users, slideExpiry);
if (identity || !authConfig.devAutoLogin) return identity;
const user = await users.findByUsername(authConfig.devAutoLogin);
if (!user || !user.active) return undefined;
return {
id: user.id,
username: user.username,
name: user.name,
role: user.role as UserRole,
mustChangePassword: false,
};
}
export function cookieOptions(authConfig: AuthConfig, maxAgeMs: number) {
return {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: "lax" as const,
secure: authConfig.cookieSecure,
path: "/",
maxAge: maxAgeMs,
};
}
/** Sets the session cookie with the same remaining lifetime the server uses. */
export function setSessionCookie(
res: Response,
authConfig: AuthConfig,
sessions: SessionStore,
sessionId: string
): void {
const session = sessions.get(sessionId, false);
if (!session) return;
res.cookie(SESSION_COOKIE, sessionId, cookieOptions(authConfig, sessions.remainingMs(session)));
}
const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]);
/**
* CSRF defense for cookie-authenticated writes.
*
* SameSite=Lax alone is not enough here: every other service on the same
* host (other ports of the same IP) counts as "same-site" and may receive the
* cookie. Fetch Metadata is also not guaranteed on plain HTTP in the LAN.
* Every write therefore needs an application header that HTML forms cannot
* set; a cross-origin fetch would require a CORS preflight, which the API does
* not permit. Sec-Fetch-Site remains an additional browser-side check.
*/
export function requireSameOriginForWrites(): RequestHandler {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (SAFE_METHODS.has(req.method)) {
next();
return;
}
if (req.get(WRITE_REQUEST_HEADER_NAME) !== WRITE_REQUEST_HEADER_VALUE) {
res.status(403).json({ error: "Schreibzugriff ohne gültigen Anwendungsnachweis abgelehnt." });
return;
}
const fetchSite = req.headers["sec-fetch-site"];
if (fetchSite === undefined || fetchSite === "same-origin" || fetchSite === "none") {
next();
return;
}
res.status(403).json({ error: "Anfrage von fremder Herkunft abgelehnt." });
};
}
/** Protects /api. Only login, status and logout stay reachable without a session. */
export function createAuthGuard(
authConfig: AuthConfig,
sessions: SessionStore,
users: Pick<UserStore, "findById" | "findByUsername">,
openPaths: readonly string[] = ["/auth/login", "/auth/status", "/auth/logout"]
): RequestHandler {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (openPaths.includes(req.path)) {
next();
return;
}
resolveRequestIdentity(req, authConfig, sessions, users)
.then((identity) => {
if (!identity) {
res.status(401).json({ error: "Nicht angemeldet." });
return;
}
req.authUser = identity;
const sessionId = sessionIdFromRequest(req);
if (sessionId) setSessionCookie(res, authConfig, sessions, sessionId);
next();
})
.catch(next);
};
}
/** Blocks everything except logout and the password change while a start password is still in use. */
export function requirePasswordChanged(): RequestHandler {
const allowed = new Set(["/auth/me", "/auth/change-password", "/auth/logout"]);
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (!req.authUser?.mustChangePassword || allowed.has(req.path)) {
next();
return;
}
res.status(403).json({
error: "Bitte zuerst ein eigenes Passwort setzen.",
mustChangePassword: true,
});
};
}
export function requireRole(role: UserRole): RequestHandler {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (req.authUser?.role !== role) {
res.status(403).json({ error: "Keine Berechtigung für diese Aktion." });
return;
}
next();
};
}